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ABSTRACT: All political sciences share the same logic and methods as the empirical social sciences and 
therefore produce perceptive knowledge. Empirical knowledge is based on a specific kind of observation 
driven by a set of theoretically developed concepts related to clearly observable social phenomena. Not all 
the concepts, however, are readily amenable to observational terms. We usually need to proceed to their 
operationalization. The formulation and the operational definition of the empirical concepts does not ex-
haust the analytic process. It is also necessary to observe how the phenomenon occurs in the reality, pro-
ceeding to classification or typological constructions and, sometimes, to the production of multi-
dimensional models. Only after this process will the formulation of hypotheses be possible. They will later 
be verified through the use of methods of empirical control. The most frequently used activity in political 
sociology is comparison, which is the main method of any social science according to most scholars. Com-
parison can be carried out both among a certain number of cases or within a single case by comparing it in 
its historical development. The temporal dimension becomes crucial when one wishes to produce histori-
cally rooted generalizations and theories, therefore confined to a spatial and temporal dimension. Before 
proceeding with the comparison we must make sure that the cases selected are actually comparable and 
that they possess at least one property in common. The objective of this paper is therefore to describe 
forms and styles of comparison within the logic of social and political sciences. 
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1. The research logic in the social sciences  
 
The need for specialization has meant that several approaches to the study of poli-
tics have been developed. In all cases they all share the logic and methods of the em-
pirical social sciences. The term “empirical” is derived from the Greek ἐμπειρία (em-
peiria), composed of ἐν, ἦν (in, inside) and πεῖρα (test), which suggests that knowledge 
is based on the observation and the sensory experience of the subject within a reality 
encountered in its entirety. All the modern sciences are based on this assumption, de-
parting from the speculative tradition of philosophy. Also political sociology, like the 
other social sciences, has historically refined its instruments of research and analysis, 
distancing itself from political philosophy. Scientific explanations must always be veri-
fied and, for this reason, the primary task of the social sciences is to describe phenom-
ena under investigation, that is, to understand them in terms of observation. If the 
problem of the philosophers is to answer the Why-question (ie why the world, the uni-
verse, the violence, the dictatorship and the democracy), social scientists limit them-
selves to seek answers to the equally important How-question (ie how the real world is 
made and works). Empirical knowledge is therefore always adherent to the facts and 
produces a form of “perceptive” knowledge, based on sensory perception. 
This is not to say that empirical knowledge is concrete because it is immersed in ac-
tual fact, while non-empirical knowledge is abstract. Any form of knowledge needs in 
fact to rely on concepts that lie at certain levels of abstraction, but in the case of social 
sciences, this abstraction should always be traced back to observational terms. It is a 
problem that philosophers or theologians do not raise, because their form of know-
ledge is not necessarily satisfied by a descriptive response. Philosophical knowledge 
transcends «the empirical» and uses speculative language (Sartori 1980, 32). Its 
knowledge is not perceived but conceived and its object is not the mundus sensibilis 
but the mundus intelligibilis. Of course, the aspiration of every science is always nomo-
thetic, from the greek νόμον τίθημι (nomon títhemi), that is aimed at the production of 
laws (which in the social sciences, as we shall see, is a controversial matter). This 
means that, after describing how, social scientists must still hazard one or more expla-
nations about why. Let's say that, unlike what happens in philosophy, in sociology why 
is always preceded by the analysis of how, the description is therefore placed before 
the explanation. 
Before coming to the description of a phenomenon and, possibly, to its explanation, 
every social researcher should formulate a research question according to five criteria: 
1) attention to the problem; 2) relevance of the topic; 3) knowledge of the literature, 
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i.e. the state of the art; 4) precise formulation; 5) empirical controllability of the formu-
lation itself: 
 
A) «Attention to the problem»: the first criterion is derived from the subjective 
interests of the researcher. When we choose to study a socio-political phenomenon 
we do it on the basis of our willingness to deal with one specific issue rather than 
another. Each scholar receives some inputs from the external environment and 
responds to them, forming an idea about the world around him. For example, by 
reading newspapers, or simply by living in a social situation, each individual deve-
lops a certain curiosity thanks to which he directs his attention in one direction 
rather than another. It is the sensitivity of the researcher and his system of values 
that guides him to a specific issue. This does not mean that it is then the value 
system that embodies the whole path; here we come to the theme of the Weberian 
value-freedom of science. Every sociologist should try to remain impartial when 
conducting research, otherwise they risk producing ideological (and therefore 
mystifying) knowledge, preventing the advancement of social knowledge. It is clear 
that no researcher can be completely neutral, because neutrality is almost impos-
sible and even not desirable, but it is also true that every social scientist can use a 
analysis and techniques that enable him to limit the influence of his own pre-
judices. 
B) «Relevance of the topic»: the second criterion that a scholar should follow in the 
formulation of a research question is the relevance of the object to be investigated. 
Social sciences claim to have a certain utility, so sociological and political analysis 
should at least aspire to solve socio-political problems, focusing on phenomena and 
processes characterized by a certain social significance. 
C) «State of the art»: when scholars are going to formulate a research question, it is 
presumed they intend to produce an advance in knowledge. This presupposes an 
awareness of the state of the art, i.e. the studies already performed and published 
on a particular topic. This allows each researcher to critically rethink their precon-
ceived ideas and the possible hypotheses to be formulated. 
D) «Precise formulation»: the precise formulation of an empirical question presuppo-
ses a clear definition of the context, that is, the space and time frame within which 
phenomena under investigation occur or have occurred. At the same time, a preci-
se empirical conceptualization of the object is required. On the conceptual define-
tion of the problem depends a good part of the research path. Every empirical con-
cept must therefore be able to be «operationalized», that is attributed to observa-
ble phenomena, hence the need to resort to forms of «classification» or «typolo-
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gies» and, subsequently, to the construction of «hypotheses» that should be su-
bject to «empirical control». 
E) «Empirical control»: the issue of empirical control is highly relevant because it is 
closely linked to the choice of the best method for testing the assumptions made. 
No scientific explanation is possible without this step which presupposes the choice 
of one of the available methods of control of the empirical reality. As we shall see 
later, in political sociology the most useful method is “comparison” implemented in 
one of its several forms and carried out through a variety of techniques. 
 
 
2. Definition and operationalization of empirical concepts 
 
We have mentioned above that the definition of the empirical concepts to be opera-
tionalized is a fundamental criterion. When we speak about the formation of concepts, 
we also mean their subsequent treatment and systematization. In the words of Sartori 
(1984), a concept can be understood as «unity of thought» just as words are «units of 
language». Each concept is expressed by a term (a word) whose meaning is stated by 
means of a specific definition and related to specific referents (i.e. attributable to ob-
servable things). The case of maximum observability of an empirical concept is realized 
when it is immediately susceptible to operationalization, hence when it is possible to 
specify the operations required for its measurement, a case that rarely occurs in the 
social sciences. 
 
 
2.1. The Construction of empirical concepts  
 
The procedures for the construction of an empirical concept are illustrated in Figure 
1. Firstly, it is necessary to establish the relationship between a «word», which names 
the concept, and a «meaning», that is its «characterizing definitions» (left side of Fig. 
1). What needs to be identified is therefore its «connotation» or «intension»,i.e. the 
set of «properties» that the researcher attributes to it. A concept is called «ambigu-
ous» when it is poorly connoted. The easiest way to connote a concept is to use «de-
clarative definitions» commonly found by consulting a dictionary or by using the ety-
mology of the term. Secondly, a concept should be defined by assigning one or more 
empirical referents to it (right side of Fig. 1). What needs to be identified is therefore 
its «denotation» or «extension»,i.e. the class of (observable) objects applied to it. A 
concept is called «vague» when it is badly denoted. 
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Figure 1 – Formations of the empirical concepts 
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The relationship between connotation and denotation, within a hypothetical scale of 
abstraction, is inversely proportional. The smaller the features that the researcher at-
taches to a concept (ie the more ambiguous a concept is), the greater the number of 
objects to which it may be applied. Conversely, the more a concept is connoted, the 
fewer the objects to which it may be applied. Let's take the example of research on 
student movements. We firstly have to define a social movement: we can define it as 
«a network of informal relationships among individuals who share the same beliefs». 
At this point, there are more or less three elements of the connotation: «relational in-
formality», «encounter between individuals», «sharing of beliefs». These undoubtedly 
fall into the characterization of a social movement, but also of a group of friends, two 
very different cases.  
To reduce the vagueness of the concept, it needs to be less ambiguous, therefore 
more defining elements must be added to the connotation. We could then say that a 
social movement is «a network of informal relationships between individuals and 
groups who share the same beliefs, are linked by mutual trust and solidarity and act 
collectively». Compared to the previous definition four other connotative elements 
have been added: «presence of groups» (not just individuals), «trust», «solidarity» and 
«collective action». At this point, the number of objects to which the concept can be 
applied decreases, but this definition is still too vague, because it may include a social 
movement as well as a religious sect, or even the supporters of a football team. The 
connotation should be further enriched by adding some more elements, such as for 
example «conflict» and «protest». We can then provide a fairly comprehensive defini-
tion: a social movement can therefore be defined as a «network of informal relation-
ships between individuals and groups who share the same beliefs, are linked by mutual 
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trust and solidarity and act collectively in a conflictual way through a frequent recourse 
to protest». Now the concept is not ambiguous and its referents are determined. What 
is now left to identify is only the issue of the contentious behavior (school, university, 
work, environment, etc.) in order to discriminate the type of social movement we are 
referring (student, worker, environmentalist, etc.). The main effort is therefore to sep-
arate the “defining” (ie necessary) from the “contingent” characteristics. 
 
 
2.2. The operationalization of empirical concepts 
 
Some empirical concepts are placed on a high level of abstraction and, for this rea-
son, they do not have immediately observable referents. They should therefore be 
traced back to concrete, visible and measurable elements. This procedure, which is 
placed in the path between «meaning» and «empirical referents» (see the right side of 
fig. 1) is called «operationalization» and indicates the necessary steps whereby the re-
searcher gives empirical content to not immediately observable concepts (Bruschi 
1999, 72-77; Cannavò 1984). Let’s think of concepts such as «democracy», «political 
system», «government», «authority»: they are all expressions of everyday use, yet they 
are so abstract that they need to be handled using «empirical indicators» and «opera-
tional definitions». Indicators express a bond of semantic representation between a 
more general concept and a more specific one through which an operational definition 
can be provided. For example, if we want to investigate the «level of democracy», we 
can find a significant property in political participation. It is necessary, however, to 
identify an empirical indicator that allows us to analyze participation. To be able to 
measure this concept it is necessary to resort to simpler concepts that are related to 
the more general one of «participation» through a link of indication. For example, the 
percentage of people who vote. The indicator is expressed as a variable (in this case 
the vote) detectable through qualitative categorizations or through numerical mea-
sures. In the latter case, we can also develop «indexes» able to numerically synthesize 
the information collected on the basis of certain indicators. Back to our example, if we 
admit that an indicator of competition related to participation is given by the volatility 
of the vote (i.e. the change of voting orientation from one election to another), it 
would be possible to statistically combine data from different elections in different 
countries in order to produce an index of democracy. This index would suggest that 
«greater competition» and «high electoral participation» also mean «high democracy». 
In general, the use of more than one indicator is essential to the empirical analysis of a 
given phenomenon.  
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To summarize the steps of the analytical process, following Lazarsfeld (1969 vol.1, 41 
ff.), we can say that: 1) the analysis begins from the «definition of an empirical con-
cept», which is the phenomenon we want to investigate; 2) the concept has to be di-
vided into dimensions or properties; 3) it is then necessary to identify the largest num-
ber of indicators deemed relevant; 4) when it is possible (as in quantitative research) it 
could also be useful to formulate indexes. 
 
 
3. Classification and methods of empirical control 
 
Conceptual formulation and operationalization does not exhaust the analytic pro-
cess. An overview of the phenomenon must be implemented by observing how it oc-
curs in reality. Through the connotation we can create an initial distinction of the con-
cept from other related ones. A next step is the division of phenomena into «classes» 
or «types». 
Classification process is the intellectual operation through which the denotation of a 
concept is divided into classes (Marradi 1987, 44). In this regard, it is useful to identify 
a criterion of discrimination and differentiation between multiple realities, then attrib-
ute them to the single classes. This process is very rigid. For this reason, sociologists 
and political scientists often build typologies (i.e. multidimensional classifications). The 
process of typology construction is a form of reconnaissance of already defined reali-
ties according to one or more differentiation criteria. The analysis of the party systems 
can provide a useful example for the definition of a typology. Based on the number of 
parties and their location on the political spectrum, it is in fact possible to produce ty-
pologies of one-party, two-party, and multi-party systems, in turn separable into sub-
types through the identification of additional criteria. 
Both classification and typology have some problems: first, classes and types must 
arise at the same level of abstraction, otherwise we risk ruining the analysis. We can-
not compare multi-party systems, one-party systems, and polarized pluralism systems, 
because the latter is rather a subtype of a multi-party system. Second, both typologies 
and classifications have the limitation of producing an oversimplification of reality, act-
ing as a filter with respect to complex and multidimensional phenomena. 
One way to avoid the excessive loss of information implied in the classificatory logic 
may be to develop multidimensional models that take us back to the concept of «ideal 
type» theorized by Max Weber who, as everyone knows, defined it as a selection of 
decisive elements of a complex historical situation, handled in a simplified framework. 
By extracting some elements from historical situations, the researcher makes them an-
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alytically comparable. In short, an ideal type concept is a sort of prototype and it can 
be built by a work of abstraction and combination of a number of elements, all present 
in reality but only rarely, if ever, in that specific form. The notion of «ideal type» is very 
close to that of «model» in which the various aspects of a phenomenon are traced in a 
unified framework without necessarily producing a classifications or typologies. For ex-
ample, we can consider the different party models (notables, vanguard, mass, cartel, 
etc.) identified, as we shall see, on the basis of certain characteristics (dimensions) that 
facilitate analysis and comparability.  
All of these operations - from the operationalization to the elaboration of classes, ty-
pologies or models - require a collection of information and data that can occur in sev-
eral ways, either by drawing on secondary data (ie already collected by others), or re-
trieving them directly (analysis of documents, interviews, questionnaires, direct obser-
vations, etc.). This allows us to formulate hypotheses about the relationship between 
variables. Having to analyze a phenomenon and its functioning may in fact be useful to 
identify, within a specific context, the relationship between the independent, depend-
ent and intervening variables. The «dependent variable» is the phenomenon we want 
to explain, the «independent variable» is the one we assume (hypothesize) may be the 
cause of the phenomenon itself, the «intervening variable» is a third kind of variable 
that influences causal dynamics and helps us to explain the phenomenon (the depend-
ent variable) better. 
 
 
3.1. The methods of empirical control 
 
The assumptions on possible correlations between variables need to be empirically 
controlled. Here we enter the domain of methodology, one of the main tasks is empiri-
cal control. We can identify four main control methods: «Experimental method», «sta-
tistical method», «comparative method», and «case study». 
 
A) «Experimental method»: although widely used in the exact sciences and in psycho-
logy, it is difficult to adapt to political sociology, because it presupposes the for-
mation (selection) of two groups of individuals chosen according to the objectives 
of the research and distinguished according to certain criteria. One of the two 
groups (the experimental group) is subjected to some stimuli in order to consider 
the reaction of its members, while the other group (the control group) is not 
exposed to stimuli. Comparison between the two groups enables the actual impact 
of the stimulus on the behavior of the members to be evaluated. In other words, it 
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is possible to isolate the independent variable and assess its impact on dependent 
variables. It is without doubt the safest method when the aim is to identify causal 
relationships. But, as mentioned, it is usually difficult to implement this method in 
political sociology. Political analysis often focuses on macro-processes (revolution, 
modernization, democratization, etc.) that are not susceptible to experimental ana-
lysis. 
B) «Statistical method»: it also allows variables to be isolated, but cannot be used in 
all research: first, it assumes that the researcher has numerical data to be statisti-
cally treated; second, it assumes a high number of cases. Statistically, it is possible 
to isolate variables assumed to be relevant. For example, if we intend to analyze 
the impact of the «educational qualification» on the level of «political activism» of 
a population of young people, we can do it by turning into «parameters» (i.e. kee-
ping them constant) other possible intervening variables such as the «sex» or the 
«political orientation of the parents». We need a sufficiently representative sample 
of individuals of the whole universe to produce analysis with a certain relevance. 
But several scholars express serious concerns about the quantification of qualita-
tive data. To measure (ie to quantify) the ideological distance between political 
actors is very difficult, the risk is always to introduce elements of arbitrariness due 
to the choices of the researcher who attaches a cardinal value to the cases. 
C) «Comparative method»: even if it does not guarantee the same reliability as the 
experimental and statistical methods, it is the most important method in the social 
sciences. Actually it would not even be correct to define it as a method, because 
comparison is a cognitive activity present in both experimental and statistical a-
ction. It is the activity of comparing two or more states, of two or more properties, 
of two or more objects in a specific historical moment or even in a broader period 
of time. It is the most widely used mode to produce empirical propositions without 
much straining and manipulations of reality. We will devote the next section to 
comparison. 
D) «Case study»: it is a particular strategy of comparison that many scholars connect 
to the historical method. It may be understood as a method whereby a single case 
is thoroughly examined, for example by comparison of the properties within multi-
ple points of time. In this way it is possible to analyze the specificity of a nation or a 
people. This can already be useful to outline some explanations of a specific pheno-
menon. According to Lijphart (1971; 1975), case studies can be classified as follows: 
«a-theoretical studies», mainly useful to gather information and produce descri-
ptions as lacking a theoretical framework; «interpretive studies» that refer to 
generalizations and theories, trying to verify them in an attempt to provide an 
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interpretation of the particular case; «hypothesis-generating studies», which are 
very useful to develop hypotheses and theories to be tested on cases in which the 
research is still at a pioneering level. There are also case studies aimed at control-
ling or falsifying a theory. 
 
 
3.2. Generalizations in social sciences  
 
The empirical control of hypotheses is used to provide explanations and, possibly, 
new generalizations and theories. In political research, generalizations -i.e. statements 
applicable to multiple objects - are necessarily «limited». The unpredictability of social 
phenomena precludes in fact the establishment of absolutely valid rules. Every expla-
nation and every theory, to quote Tilly (1981), must be historically and geographically 
contextualized. Yet some form of generalization should be produced. So it is necessary 
for socio-political research, following an analytic path consistent with the parameters 
described above, to be capable of producing statements that describe properties and 
express relations on the basis of a set of information and data spatially and historically 
defined.  
Even theories – in the sense of a set of propositions with a certain explanatory con-
tent - will always be «local theories» (Boudon 1984), related to data with precise tem-
poral and spatial boundaries. There have been scholars who in the past made nomo-
thetic claims, imagining that the social sciences could produce laws such as those de-
veloped in the natural sciences. We refer to the classical debate on method and to the 
opposition between nomothetic sciences, the meaning of which is already known, and 
idiographic sciences, from the greek ιδιος-γραφιχος (idios and graphikós), with the 
meaning of «describing the particular» thus denying the opportunity to express ever 
valid generalizations.  
The idiographic approach is therefore in opposition to the nomothetic assumption of 
a sort of methodological (and epistemological) continuity between the physical and so-
cial sciences. The distinction between the two approaches can be traced back to the 
German philosopher Windelband who, in the so-called «debate on method» (Method-
enstreit), at a conference held in 1894, reported the controversy between neo-posi-
tivists, supporters of a nomothetic approach on the model of the physical sciences, and 
those, in particular Dilthey, who thought in the opposite way. In his Introduction to the 
human sciences, Dilthey (1991) argued that the social sciences could not be superim-
posed on the physical sciences because they are characterized by their own specific 
method – i.e. the Verstehen (understanding). While the natural sciences seek to explain 
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events by reducing them to a uniform system of laws, the humanities instead try to 
«understand» single events based on the «lived experience» (Erlebnis). Scholars such 
as Winch (1958), Habermas (1988) and Gadamer (1975) subsequently identified with 
this approach which can be traced back to a humanistic and hermeneutic tradition. 
This approach is modeled on historiographical practice in which the description of 
particular facts and chronologies often sacrifices the ability to produce explanations or 
comparisons. According to Marradi (1987, 130) the choice of an idiographic approach 
does not exclude the possibility of comparing, and argues that assigning idiographic 
aims to comparison does not mean giving up the formulation of explanatory arguments 
or the adoption of statistical techniques. But let’s come back to comparison that, in the 
scientific debate, has been often the scene of a confrontation between scholars that 
reflected the classic, and in some respects sterile, conflict between idiographic and 
nomothetic, as well as between supporters of quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
From this point of view, in recent years, the development of studies on the comparison 
in political and social sciences has led to the overcoming of certain dichotomies until 
the proposal for integrated approaches, such as the so-called “Ragin's revolution”, 
from the name of Charles Ragin, founder of the innovative methodological school for 
the QCA (Qualitative Comparison Approach) through which attempting to bridge the 
different worlds of case-oriented researchers and quantitative cross-national research-
ers (Ragin 1987; Schneider and Wagermann 2012). Unfortunately we don’t have the 
opportunity here to analyze in-depth these new approaches but rather we can offer to 
our readers just a brief introduction to comparison in the social sciences.  
 
 
4. Comparison in the social sciences  
 
Comparison is one of the activities that shapes human experience. In addition to 
comparisons of other individuals, human beings make continuous comparisons be-
tween objects and events they encounter during their life. In the history of human 
thought, Smelser noted (1976), the tendency of groups to distort the perception of the 
«other» has become more and more evident. Over the years, some scholars have de-
veloped strategies to overcome these distortions by establishing approaches that ena-
ble the differences in organization of collective life to be understood, regardless of the 
intellectual categories of the social groups. 
These efforts have been defined in several ways - analysis between cultures, be-
tween nations, comparative studies - and have in common the need to describe and 
explain socio-cultural phenomena just as they are realized in different social units 
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(groups, societies, communities, etc.). As Emile Durkheim stated in his study on the so-
cial division of labor (Durkheim 1964), comparative sociology is not a particular branch 
of sociology; it is sociology itself that ceases to be merely descriptive and aspires to ex-
plain facts. To describe a specific situation presupposes a universe of situations which, 
to be explained, need to be compared. This awareness forces us to reflect on «compar-
ative methodology» in a broad sense as a critical evaluation of research related to the 
regulatory standards of scientific inquiry.  
Comparison in daily life is set up as a quick observation, while in science it is more 
complex. Obviously it depends on the context and objectives of comparison. Here we 
are interested on that specific form of comparison which is realized in the scientific 
field and, in particular, in the social sciences. It is therefore necessary to identify a cri-
terion in order to primarily determine the degree of complexity of comparison. To 
begin with, we need to specify that, in order to define a comparative act, it is not nec-
essary for two objects to be taken into account (for example France and Italy or, more 
simply, Carlo and Marco). As noted by Eckstein (1975, 85) and Bartolini (1991, 177), it is 
also possible to compare the states of the same object in two or more points of time 
(for example, the level of political stability in England in the sixties and in the nineties, 
or the academic performances of Carlo in the first year of college and in the last). 
«Objects», «states», «properties» and, possibly, «points of time» are therefore to be 
considered the logical elements of comparison. We now choose to follow the logical 
frame proposed by Marradi (1982). He first considers a classification that proceeds 
from the most simple to the most complex form of comparison. We talk about simple 
or elementary forms when we refer to comparison in terms of a cognitive propensity of 
human beings, as a tendency easily seen in ordinary existence. The most basic form of 
comparison - what Marradi calls the «logical atom» of comparative practice, is based 
on comparison of the «states» of two «objects» on a «property» and it can be exempli-
fied in a phrase such as «the UK is more populous than Italy». 
In this case, the UK and Italy are the two objects of comparison, the residents are 
their status on the property (i.e. populousness). In this case, comparison was based on 
an assessment of major/minor, but in the event that the property has no ordinal cate-
gories we could also have a simple judgment of same/different (i.e. «the UK is an An-
glo-Saxon country, Italy is a Latin country»), or, in other cases, of presence/absence 
(i.e. «the UK is in the Commonwealth, Italy is not»). It therefore seems clear that we 
never compare two objects «globally» but always their states on one or more proper-
ties, otherwise there is the risk of making tautological judgments, such as «the UK is 
different from Italy» and it is certainly not necessary to make a hard cognitive effort to 
reach this conclusion. 
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Since we compare the «states» and not the «objects», in order to make a compari-
son there need not necessarily be two objects but it is necessary that there be two (or 
more) states on a property. In this case, we should add the temporal element, making 
judgments like «Italy today is more populous than thirty years ago». There is one ob-
ject (Italy), but there are two states (residents) on the property (populousness). Alt-
hough the latter form of comparison may seem simple, actually it introduces some 
complexity. If in fact the first model of comparison presupposes the existence of five 
elements of three different types (one property, two states, two objects), in the second 
model, while eliminating two elements (one object, namely the United Kingdom, and 
its state on the property, i.e. British citizens), it introduce four more: the time, which 
being neither an object nor a state nor a property is a fourth element; two different 
states of time (nowadays and thirty years ago) and two states (rather than one) of the 
same object (i.e. the different number of Italian residents at the two different time 
points). 
Furthermore two states of the same object on the same property can also be differ-
entiated by associating them with two different states of a different property. Let’s 
think of the statement «Italy in the summer is more populous because of the tourists». 
This model of comparison assumes seven elements: one object (Italy), two properties 
(populousness and season) and two states on each of the two properties (greater/less 
populousness and presence/absence of tourists). In appearance this model seems sim-
pler because, by eliminating the time variable, it always presupposes seven elements, 
but of just three types (object, state, property). 
Actually this lower complexity is only apparent since the statement «Italy in the 
summer is more populous because of the tourists» presupposes an effort of induction 
based on some «observation protocols» such as: «In the summer of 2000 there were 
many tourists who crowded Italian cities». Each of these protocols consists in turn of 
seven elements: one object (Italy), the time and its state (i.e. the year or the day on 
which the protocol is reported), two properties (populousness and season) and the re-
spective states. 
Of course, the inductive process cannot settle for just one case, but it should collect 
a series of observation protocols in which the state a (higher) on the property A (popu-
lousness) tends to occur together with the state b (presence of tourists) on the proper-
ty B (season). The more observation protocols are adopted, the more solid the induc-
tion will be, so as to be able to affirm a certain link between the two properties on the 
basis of the comparison between the states of two different properties. 
As happens in daily life, in scientific activity, too, the most obvious function of com-
parison is to highlight differences between objects or, in other cases, regular connec-
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tions (or co-variation) between properties. In this way it is possible to establish that a 
property affects the other. In some situations, the available knowledge does not allow 
one single causal direction to be established between properties and consequently 
comparison does not assume an explanatory value. But explanation is not necessarily 
an aim of the researcher. Sometimes, if there is a certain causal direction, the re-
searcher is simply interested in co-variation between two or more properties. 
Summarizing the above, it is possible to reflect on the acts of comparison by focus-
ing on the distinction between «synchronic» and «diachronic» comparison. In the first 
case, as mentioned, it ignores the temporal dimension whereas the points of time are 
considered as equivalent; in the second case, it is the time variable instead that is tak-
en as a significant element. Marradi, in perfecting his analysis, highlights a brief outline 
of his reasoning (Marradi 1987, 118) by which the forms of comparison are essentially 
divided into six types (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 – Forms of Comparisons 
 
Form Points of time Objects Properties States 
S1 1 2 1 2 
S2 1 2 2 4 
S3 1 2 3 6 
D1 2 1 1 2 
D2 2 1 2 4 
D3 2 1 3 6 
 
The simplest form of synchronic comparison (form S1) corresponds to a statement 
such as «Carlo weighs as much as Marco». It consists of six logical elements: two ob-
jects (Carlo and Marco), one property on the objects (the weight), two states on the 
property (Carlo’s weight and Marco’s weight), one single point of time. Examples of 
this type of comparison can be easily located both in everyday life and in a scientific 
context. The simplest form of diachronic comparison (form D1) corresponds instead to 
a statement such as «Carlo is fatter than a year ago». In this case, there is one object 
(Carlo), but two points of time (today and a year ago). Even this act of comparison con-
sists of six logical elements: one object (Carlo), one property on the object (Carlo’s 
weight), two states on the property (Carlo’s weight today and a year ago) and two 
points of time (today and a year ago). At a conceptual level, the S1 and D1 models of 
comparison have the same level of complexity, but there are still more complex forms. 
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Synchronic comparison may in fact be articulated by increasing the number of corre-
lated properties. An example comes from a sentence such as: «On the one hand, Carlo 
gets good ratings in philosophy, but bad ratings in math. On the other hand, Marco is a 
good mathematician but a bad philosopher» (form S2). This type of comparison has 
nine logic elements: two objects (Carlo and Marco), two properties on the objects 
(school performance in mathematics and philosophy), four states on the properties 
(the specific level of performance for each subject both of Carlo and Marco ), one sin-
gle point of time. A more complex form instead consists of twelve logical elements 
(form S3): two objects, three properties, six states, one point of time. An example of 
this form comes to us from a transnational survey: «In the United States the relation-
ship between father's party preference and the interviewee’s party preference is very 
strong regardless of gender; in France the relationship is rather weak» (quoted by Fi-
deli 1998, 27). In this case, the two objects (the United States and France) are compa-
red on the basis of the states of other objects that are placed at a lower level of aggre-
gation (the interviewed individuals). 
Compared to the form D1, a more complex type of diachronic comparison (form D2) 
thus corresponds to a statement such as: «Carlo tends to gain weight when he eats ir-
regularly». This form of comparison presupposes that the author of comparison con-
siders a presumably large number of observational reports organized into two series: 
one records the weight changes of Carlo in a given period of time and under the effect 
of an incorrect diet. The other records the weight change in a period of equivalent 
time, but under the effect of proper nutrition. In this case we have nine logic elements: 
an object (Carlo), two properties (the weight of Carlo with irregular nutrition and that 
with regular nutrition), two points of time, four states on the properties (the specific 
weight of Carlo in two points of time and on both properties). In a more complex form 
of diachronic comparison (form D3) we will lastly take into account three or more 
properties such as in the statement: «Increasing the brightness of the room and reduc-
ing the number of operations performed by each worker, there has been an increase in 
productivity per employee» (ibid., 26). In this case, there are different logical elements: 
n objects (workers), three properties (brightness of the room, number of operations, 
productivity), t points of time, n*t states of the objects on the productive property. 
Obviously, a scholar interested in establishing causal links, will not be misled into 
comparing in a synchronic way. Indeed, if we adopt the concept of «cause» restrictive-
ly, we can control a causal relationship only through forms of diachronic comparison (in 
particular D2 and D3). As Marradi reminds us (1987, 78-79), a synchronic comparison 
can at best lead to identifying unidirectional or bidirectional relationships between op-
erating variables. The concept of causality presupposes the temporal antecedence of 
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the cause on the effect and this inevitably leads us to consider the placement of the in-
vestigated objects on a diachronic axis. 
The idea that comparison is realized only between states on one (S1, D1) or more 
properties (S2, S3, D2, D3) can therefore be accepted. The claim of some scholars to 
globally compare economic, political, cultural or social system looks illusory. It is not 
possible to compare an entire nation-state with another one, but it is possible to com-
pare the way some aspects of the two objects (for example, the number of inhabitants, 
the form of government, the levels of administrative decentralization, etc.) are config-
ured. 
The objects should also be compared with each other according to their states on 
the same properties. We cannot then compare the weight of Carlo with the height of 
Marco, nor the form of the Italian Government with the French Socialist Party. This 
consideration leads us to the «dilemma of comparability». When can we say that two 
objects are comparable? The answer is: when they have at least one property in com-
mon. It is difficult to imagine that Carlo and France have properties in common, it is 
easier for Carlo and Marco, or for France and Italy. This does not mean, or does not 
necessarily mean, that only similar objects can be compared. Although the presence of 
equal states on a large number of properties has some advantages, it is not a prerequi-
site to establish the possibility or the validity of comparison. Once properties have 
been defined it is possible to compare objects which are very different. 
 
 
4.1. Styles of comparison 
 
It is now necessary to establish how to assemble information. This process is consid-
ered to be «systematic» when states are collected on all the properties. Usually we 
turn to a systematic collection of information if we want to build a data matrix using 
statistical techniques. On the other hand, the research is conducted in a «non-
systematic» way when objects, properties, and states on all the properties are not de-
fined. Especially among the great comparatists of the past, such as Tocqueville (2003), 
the tendency to single out properties and their states, neglecting a clear definition of 
the objects was very frequent. This task is left to the intuition of the reader. Sometimes 
the objects are clear but the properties studied and their states are not so clear 
(Smelser 1976; de Nardis 2011b). In this case, comparison assumes the character of a 
more or less detailed description. A comparison in which the researcher, while defining 
objects and properties, does not bother to identify the states on the properties of all 
the objects has to be equally considered as non-systematic. This occurs for example 
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when, in the comparison of two objects, we introduce a specific event that concerns 
only one of these objects (such as a revolution, or the participation in a war, etc.). 
It seems obvious that a systematic collection of information has many advantages, 
especially if the aim of the researcher is to control causal hypotheses that extend to 
more cases. Following the reasoning of Fideli (1998, 50), it is possible to develop a ty-
pology of styles of comparison, taking into account both the level of analysis and the 
use of a systematic collection of information. This leads to the following most popular 
types: a) micro-analytic comparison without recourse to statistical techniques; b) mi-
cro-analytic comparison through the use of statistical techniques; c) ecological compar-
ison through the use of statistical techniques; d) macro-analytic comparison without 
systematic collection of information; e) macro-analytic comparison with systematic col-
lection of information, but without recourse to statistical techniques. 
In the micro-analytic comparison (types a and b), the objects of the survey are indi-
viduals or groups. This style of comparison often requires the use of statistical tech-
niques, especially in the case of trans-national surveys, in which national samples are 
considered, or in national surveys, in which sub-national samples are considered. In the 
macro-analytic comparison (types d and e), the objects are complex systems (national 
states, societies, cultures) on the basis of their states on global or aggregate properties. 
This style of comparison is very widespread in socio-political research. As noted by Fi-
deli (ibid., 51), «in general, macro-comparatists do not utilize statistical techniques, but 
merely bring the outcomes of their research in discursive form». In the ecological com-
parison (type c), territorial units (national, supra-national or sub-national) are com-
pared according to their states on aggregate properties that are often defined at the 
operational level by utilizing a systematic collection of census and electoral data. Let’s 
see, for example, the comparative work of Ronald Inglehart that analyzes the relation-
ship between the characteristics of the political culture, such as the proportion of citi-
zens who affirm to have trust in their countrymen, with the Gross Domestic Product of 
some Western countries (Inglehart 1990). This style involves the organization of data in 
a matrix and their processing by statistical techniques. 
 
 
4.2. Some methodological knots in comparison 
 
It is now necessary to carry out a brief analysis of the methodological problems that 
every researcher should solve. Before proceeding with any kind of operation a com-
paratist should establish: a) the «unit (or units) of analysis» on which the research 
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should be oriented; b) The space-temporal context in which the research ranks; c) the 
conceptual definition of properties (or variables). 
 
 
• The unity of analysis 
 
As stated by Kalleberg (1966, 81), before comparing two objects we have to prove 
they belong to the same class. This general consideration is methodologically correct 
and leads us to look more closely at the «dilemma of classification» of the social units 
to be compared. The «unit of analysis» is the type of object to which we attribute the 
detected information. For example, if the object of our study is the «degree of political 
activity in Italy», we could extract a sample of center-right and center-left activists at 
the regional level, and then we could gather more information through targeted inter-
views to local leaders. The answers to our questions could be attributed to individuals 
or to the parties to which they belong. In this case, they would become our unit of 
analysis. 
As Zeldich noted (1971, 282), the choice of the unit of analysis should depend on the 
considerations about the object of research. For example, it is not necessarily useful to 
identify a single city as the unit of analysis if the objective of the research is the degree 
of political participation at national level. It is evident that the propensity to a certain 
political activism is partially influenced by sub-cultural traditions, in addition to the po-
litical culture of origin. For this reason, the sample will have to include regions, cities 
and everything that represents the diversity of the national territory. It is a different 
matter concerning trans-national research in which we choose the nation as unit of 
analysis, both for the facility to gather information at that level and for the established 
trend in the social sciences to identify in the National State «the aim and the outcome 
of the (alleged) processes of integration and modernization» (Caciagli 1988, 492). 
The tendency to identify area and unit of analysis in the nation has repercussions in 
terms of formulation of terminology, determining the propensity to use interchangea-
bly expressions such as «comparative research» and «trans-national research». In fact, 
also in trans-national research it is necessary to show a flexible attitude, since the na-
tional area is not always the most appropriate for the aims of the research. For exam-
ple, where the objective of the researcher is to compare cultures or cultural systems 
we will need to choose which nations have different cultures. 
In any case, units traditionally chosen for comparative analyzes (especially if macro-
analytical and transnational) are «cultures», «societies» and «nation-states». Obvious-
ly, the features that characterize these three elements are often overlapping. In the 
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definition of a social unit, the researcher proceeds to a classification. It is proposed as 
an attempt to artificially reduce the sources of variation in the social context within 
which we place the phenomena. It is therefore necessary that processes and phenom-
ena that are considered parts of a common context are made comparable. Since a class 
is an attempt to reduce complexity, we must be careful not to oversimplify the issues 
at stake. 
Criticisms of oversimplified classifications all have in common the correct idea that 
societies grouped in macro-classes end up being so heterogeneous as to present signif-
icant elements of homogeneity with societies located in other classes. This limit is likely 
to contaminate the comparative process (Gusfield 1972; Bendix 1967). Based on this 
awareness, Smelser (1976) argues that the choice of the social units to be compared 
should be based on five criteria: a) units of analysis must be appropriate to the type of 
theoretical problem posed by the researcher; b) they should have a causal relevance 
for the phenomena under investigation; c) the same unit should not undergo any varia-
tion with respect to their empirical classification criterion (ie as nations, societies, and 
cultures); d) the selection of units of analysis should reflect the degree of availability of 
data on the units themselves; e) it would be appropriate for the selective choices of the 
researcher to be based as far as possible on standardized and repeatable procedures. 
 
 
• The spatial and temporal context 
 
After defining the unit of analysis the researcher has to identify the boundary, that is 
all the cases which will be part of the research and their historical and geographical 
context. There are studies in which it was possible to consider all the cases part of the 
population. In various ecological research projects with a nomothetic approach, after 
identifying the unit of analysis as the nation, for example in a specific geopolitical area, 
it was possible to consider all nations, which were then compared using the synchronic 
form. In other empirical situations it may be necessary to consider only a sub-set of 
cases forming part of a specific population, and, in this eventuality, selection presup-
poses some precautions. Usually it is inappropriate for the researcher to rely on a ran-
dom extraction, especially in trans-national research. 
We are therefore faced with the problem of the choice of the most appropriate unit 
to be selected as the sample from the universe (tribes, societies, cultures, nations, 
etc.). At this level, we find the so-called Galton’s problem, from the name of the an-
thropologist who first recognized it, which states that it is very difficult to identify soci-
eties and cultures developed independently since there is a good chance that any simi-
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larities are determined by the historical spread of certain cultural characteristics. If this 
concern is well founded, serious doubts about the possibility of correlating the ele-
ments on an intercultural level are justified, as these correlations could be polluted by 
the interdependence of the cases (diffusion process). 
Due to the indefinite extension of the historical diffusion, many sampling problems 
related to cross-cultural comparisons cannot be solved. Being aware of this, scholars 
have developed some practical measures to reduce the unintended sources of associa-
tion. Faced with the problems that occur in defining the proper mode of extraction of 
cases that have to compose the spatial and temporal boundary of the research, schol-
ars have over the years produced two distinct strategies: the so-called strategy of the 
«most different systems design» and that of the «most similar systems design». 
In the first case (most different systems design), the researcher selects very hetero-
geneous cases. This does not necessarily imply the choice of a large number of cases; it 
is sufficient that these cases present extreme values on the dependent variable. Two 
examples of the adoption of this strategy in macro-analytic comparison are the works 
by Barrington Moore on the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) and 
by Theda Skocpol on States and Social Revolutions (1979). Both scholars select distant 
cases in space and time, proposing to develop valid generalizations. To define what dy-
namics can more easily determine the success of a fascist, communist, or democratic 
regime, Moore considers eight countries (China, France, Germany, Japan, India, Eng-
land, Russia and the United States). Skocpol, for her part, analyzes the possible causes 
of the three major revolutions, the French revolution in 1789, the Russian revolution in 
1917, and the Chinese one in the thirties, referring to a marginal and sporadic extent to 
other cases where there was never a revolutionary outcome. 
The second type of strategy (most similar systems design) has been widely used in 
comparative research with a micro-analytic approach. A paradigmatic example comes 
from the work produced by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Sci-
ence Research Council that, at the end of the sixties, organized a transnational survey 
with the aim of testing the hypothesis of a co-variation relationship between socio-
economic status and the level of political participation. The survey was conducted in 
seven countries politically, economically and culturally distant from each other (Aus-
tria, Japan, India, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, the Netherlands, and the United States). The re-
search coordinators themselves admitted that the research design was «powerful but 
risky». It would be powerful if the aim of the scholars was to identify uniformities be-
tween different cases. If in fact they had found uniformities in such a diverse group, 
they would have had some assurance that outcomes were generalizable. But if only dif-
ferences emerged, the outcomes would be difficult to interpret because each differ-
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ence found may be the result of any of the many substantial differences between the 
selected countries, or, just as easily, a pure artifact of one of the many differences in 
research procedures (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). 
The strategy of the most different systems design presents a further drawback. Ex-
cluding a control on the sources of variation, the comparatist is forced to consider a 
very large number of independent variables. A problem that does not arise in the case 
of the strategy of the most similar cases (or «controlled comparison»). This strategy is 
supported by anthropologists such as Eggan (1954, 748) and Kluckohn (1962, 693) and 
by political scientists such as Eulau (1962, 397-407) and Lijphart (1975). It is assumed 
that the properties (cultural, socio-economic and political) in which the objects have 
similar states can be considered as constant. These properties cannot be imputed for 
the variations of the states on the properties. By excluding similar properties, the re-
searcher reduces the number of properties on which to focus. Similar properties are 
taken as parametric (or contextual) variables and only the differences are to be consid-
ered. 
While the advantages of the controlled comparisons are evident, there are some el-
ements of weakness that require caution: first, different levels of the analytical system 
present various parametric conditions that may lead to changes in the causal signifi-
cance of the associations; secondly, the belief that the parametric control of a variable 
can be achieved simply by noting that two neighboring systems, or different levels of a 
system, are similar with respect to that variable is questionable. 
 
 
• Definition of the properties 
 
In order to perform a comparison, the researcher should avoid using overly specific 
concepts. The risk is that of not being able to find similar examples in other cultures or 
groups. Almond and Coleman, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with the ability to 
compare the traditional concepts adopted in political science. These concepts would in 
fact be limited by the single reference to Western societies and become totally inade-
quate when it is necessary to compare political systems structured on different cul-
tures (Almond and Coleman 1960, 3-4). In this regard, the two scholars, using the sup-
port of sociological and anthropological literature, endeavored to extract from the 
classical conceptual apparatus some general concepts, such as «political system», «po-
litical socialization», «articulation and aggregation of interests» which could also be 
suitable for the analysis of emerging or otherwise non-Western political forms. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 7(3) 2014: 576-615, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v7i3p576 
 
597 
 
As Smelser noted, the search for appropriate categories is pulled in two different di-
rections since, on the one hand, to compare different systems one should adopt a con-
ceptual apparatus located at higher levels of abstraction; on the other hand, a greater 
conceptual abstraction creates an opposite pressure to the re- specification of the rules 
for identifying empirical indicators, which could be expressed within the various sys-
tems contained in more general categories (Smelser 1976). The researcher is continual-
ly caught in a vise that, on the one hand, makes him subject to the risk of resorting to 
specific but limited concepts; on the other hand, he is led to use more abstract and 
therefore overly inclusive concepts. Sociological literature offers us two possible solu-
tions to this dilemma. 
The first solution can be defined as «relativistic alternative». It takes into considera-
tion the contextual variability of each phenomenon therefore remaining faithful to the 
meaning of the phenomenon itself. In the economic field, Mauss tried to properly rep-
resent the various ways in which different cultures have defined the concept of «eco-
nomic», then choosing only those areas where it was possible to access the «mind of 
society» through documentation and philological research (Mauss 1954, 2-3). Other 
scholars, especially in the field of anthropology, are placed on similar positions. In their 
view, the attempt to conceptualize all problems and tendencies as if they were con-
stant is questionable. They should rather be seen as aspects of the cultural infrastruc-
ture (Clark 1970). In general, it would be helpful if the level of abstraction of the varia-
bles and general dimensions were commensurate with the field of comparison re-
quired. 
The second solution consists of an attempt to keep the definition of general con-
cepts on a higher level of abstraction, thus admitting a greater range of variation of the 
context. Functionalist scholars, whose theoretical approach is based on the definition 
of specific and invariant reference points, such as the «functional requirements» of so-
ciety, tend to support this solution. These requirements form the basis for the identifi-
cation of certain structures, understood as variable expressions of invariant categories 
(or functions). Functional prerequisites usually refer to things that should be done in 
every society so that it can continue to operate. For example, generalized conditions 
necessary for the maintenance of the system (Aberle et.al. 1972, 61). 
But, as pointed out by Lucian Pye (1958), in non-democratic or at least non-Western 
countries the political sphere is rarely sharply differentiated from the sphere of per-
sonal and social relationships. This requires the researcher to make certain considera-
tions that the functionalist approach tends to overlook. It will be very likely that, in the 
case of Western systems, the processes of political influence are more easily registered 
in the form of formal exchanges between politically relevant units (parties, groups, 
Fabio de Nardis, The logical structures of the comparison 
  
598 
 
movements); while in the case of non-Western systems, the same processes presuma-
bly take a less differentiated and more informal form. In this case, the researcher 
should consider the different models of kinship and often tribal social interaction to be 
able to infer the peculiar patterns of political influence. Scholars who identify with the 
functionalist paradigm have never developed convincing rules for the specification of 
the empirical indicators that reflect the different functions within social systems. 
Moreover, this effort is likely to be futile since, as Sartori noted, each structure, from 
country to country, can perform more than one function and often different functions, 
so that the same function finds structural alternatives and can be performed by differ-
ent structures (Sartori 1970). 
Now we come to the question of the empirical indicators whose comparability, we 
have seen, depends on both the classification procedures of units of analysis and the 
variable they should represent. Following the reasoning of Smelser, we can pose the 
matter of the comparability of indicators in the form of two basic questions: 1) Is the 
process by which an indicator has been created consistent with the theory of that pro-
cess more or less implicit in the mind of the researcher? To put it in other words, is the 
indicator valid? That is, to what degree can it actually provide a measure of the variable 
to which it refers? 2) In the case of comparative analysis of dissimilar social units, is the 
process by which the indicator has been generated the same as that used in all the 
units of analysis considered? This second question raises the problem of «equiva-
lence», and then, from the point of view of measurement, of the measure’s reliability 
in different contexts of analysis. 
The choice of the indicators, and therefore their consequent validity, is not based on 
the characteristics of the indicator itself or on the criteria adopted for the identification 
of possible measurement errors in each indicator, but rather on the theoretical pur-
poses for which it is necessary to apply the measure and its correspondence with the 
logical meaning of the variable represented. Last but not least, the validity of an indica-
tor depends on an implicit understanding of the existing relationship between the pro-
cess by which it is produced and the theoretical purposes of the researcher. The prob-
lem of «equivalence», and therefore the comparability of measurements taken from 
different social units, concerns the need to determine whether a phenomenon meas-
ured in the same way but in different systems can be considered an indicator of the 
same variable. 
The same problems of comparability arise in various ways in different social research 
regardless of the methods used. In fact, when the researcher is actively involved in the 
production of data, he can theoretically control certain sources of error, but it is also 
possible that the active role of the researcher may be a harbinger of further errors. For 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 7(3) 2014: 576-615, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v7i3p576 
 
599 
 
example, in the case of processing of a questionnaire, the problem arises of the trans-
latability of questions and concepts that in different systems can assume different 
meanings (Ervin and Bower 1952). The same questionnaire can cause different reac-
tions depending on the culture of the population to whom it is distributed (Wilson 
1958; Scheuch 1968; Mitchell 1968). 
All these problems substantially affect the variation of the context of the indicators 
in different social units (Przeworski and Teune 1966). Also in this case, scientific litera-
ture proposes several solutions that correspond to the attempt to control some 
sources of error. Economists, for example, in order to have adequate measures of the 
real income in different countries have developed tricks to incorporate non-monetary 
economic indicators in the context of detections of national income, reducing the mar-
gin for error in the measurement (Bennett 1966; Beckerman 1966; Beckerman and Ba-
con 1966). Political scientists have instead developed measures to incorporate some 
sources of error in aggregated indexes in order to increase the comparability (Gurr 
1966; 1968). Psychologists use non-verbal tools and projective tests to increase the de-
gree of cross-cultural comparability, in an attempt to avoid the sources of error due to 
variations in language (Anderson 1967). 
In macro-analytical comparisons the problem of equivalence is solved with an em-
phasis on the functional structures. Barrington Moore (1966), for example, compared 
bureaucracies, social classes and political movements, which in his view had played a 
role in promoting the modernization process. In other macro-analytical research, links 
of structural equivalence are defined as in Sartori’s research on the relationship be-
tween electoral systems and party systems (Sartori 1976; 1982). According to this logic, 
it is possible to state that the American and the British two-party system are structural-
ly similar. When defining a property the researcher always has to consider the contex-
tual dimension even if the comparison then requires the extraction of the properties 
themselves from their context. This poses a problem of «contextual equivalence» that 
arises in all comparative research. Sometimes the reduction of the spatial and temporal 
context helps to limit the risk of a weak equivalence in the lexical (and operational) def-
inition of the properties. 
In any case, the dilemma of the conceptualization and the relative level of abstrac-
tion as well as that of equivalence probably cannot be solved by reducing the abstrac-
tion in favor of a higher specification, nor, as functionalists would, through a taxonomic 
approach, which therefore prefers overly high levels of abstraction. Again, the issue 
may be solved by referring to the theoretical aims of the researcher and of the compar-
ison level to which he actually aspires. 
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5. On the relationship between history and sociology 
 
When we speak of diachronic comparison, as well as of idiographic approaches or of 
the case study method, we are implicitly referring to the history’s contribution to soci-
ology. The social sciences have a long tradition of comparative-historical studies. The 
founders of our discipline had used the historical comparison approach as the back-
bone of almost all of their work. Even after the twentieth century division of social sci-
ence into many specialized disciplines, historical-comparative research maintained 
some relevance. It is only since the mid-twentieth century that we have witnessed a 
partial eclipse of historical studies in the social sciences in favor of studies aimed at 
producing more and more universal generalizations and, as such, difficult to relate to 
an approach that placed investigations in a limited spatial and temporal dimension. 
In recent decades, there has been a resurgence of interest on the part of sociologists 
and political scientists in a research approach that connects to the old tradition of his-
torical and comparative studies. This resurgence of sociological taste for historical 
analysis is linked to the need to explain structural processes that unfold on a large scale 
and that are attributable to the different aspects of the social change. Scholars have 
abandoned abstract generalization, without giving up the ability to produce causal ex-
planations. Cases and processes are analyzed at a lower level of abstraction, trying to 
explain the present also and above all by drawing important lessons from the past. 
So-called historical sociology aims to shed light on the meanings within specific con-
texts, focusing on the historical sequence of social phenomena but without confining 
them to the narration and always trying to identify the particular (and potentially re-
curring) aspects of specific social structures and specific patterns of change. 
In the years immediately following World War II, with the tendency of many scholars 
to investigate the so-called Grand Theory, which is a theoretical paradigm able to defin-
itively come to grips with the social reality, the attention to historical processes was 
eclipsed by general theories of society or by radical forms of abstract and a-historical 
empiricism. Wright Mills, one of the best interpreters of American critical sociology, in 
one of his most passionate essays, stated his disagreement with some sociological 
trends with particular reference to the anti-historicism typical of the new theoretical 
and empirical paradigms, stating with clarity that every social science - or rather, every 
social study worthy of note - requires the historical significance of the concepts adopt-
ed and a great use of historical materials (Wright Mills 1959, 145). 
In his famous What is History?, the historian Edward Hallett Carr, in a passage in 
which he reflected on the relationship between sociology and history, said: 
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If [sociology] is to become a fruitful field of study, it must, like history, concern itself 
with the relation between the unique and the general. But it must also become dynamic 
– a study not of society at rest (for no such society exists), but of social change and de-
velopment. For the rest, I would only say that the more sociological theory history be-
comes, and the more historical sociology becomes, the better for both (Carr 1963, 84). 
 
Carr’s reflection is worthy of consideration. The invitation to integrate the unique 
and the general, going beyond the classical controversy between the idiographic and 
the nomothetic, would be possible mainly through the adoption of social theories 
rooted in historical processes. Just as the study of social change presupposes the as-
sumption of good theories rather than good methods, sociology should focus on the 
study of the connections between the great changes and the changes they produce in 
the dynamics of social life. On this, Tilly noted (1981, 212), it is possible to identify an 
initial convergence between history and sociology. This convergence has long been 
present in social history, where we can find two fundamental callings, the first is «ret-
rospective» and the second «perspective». 
In the first case, the scholar (historian or sociologist) assumes certain features of the 
contemporary world as problematic and then moves retrospectively to trace the ori-
gins and transformations of certain phenomena. According to Tilly, the two aspects of 
the contemporary world that most distinguish our age compared to the times and 
places of the past are, on the one hand, the prevalence in the productive world of wa-
ge labor under conditions of substantial expropriation; on the other hand, the great po-
wer of nation states. If we agree with this idea, a retrospective analysis should focus on 
the study of the processes of proletarianization and construction of the states, as well 
as on the interactions between the two phenomena and their contemporary develop-
ments. 
In the second case, the scholar wonders what would have happened if in some deci-
sive moments in history when the people (or their leaders) were faced with two or 
more options, we had taken one way rather than another. It is a question of under-
standing how and why they prevailed over other historical options. Both callings (retro-
spective and perspective) or approaches can be useful to the work of historians and so-
ciologists. 
According to Tilly, the approaches of sociologists and historians to the analysis of so-
cial events are different, but there are good reasons to try to identify the parameters 
for a practical synthesis of the two approaches based on the need to develop historical-
ly grounded social theories. Such an effort necessitates our careful reflection on the 
merits of historical research. First, we should restore some conceptual order by affirm-
ing the importance of the work of historians. There have been, especially in sociology, 
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scholars who expressed the conviction that they were able to analytically grasp social 
cases without knowing their historical origins, namely the specific contexts from which 
these cases emerged. This sociological effect is clear in the following words by Lipset: 
 
From an ideal-typical point of view, the task of the sociologist is to formulate general 
hypotheses, hopefully set within a larger theoretical framework, and to test them. His in-
terest in the way in which a nation such as the United States formulated a national iden-
tity is to specify propositions about the general processes involved in the creation of na-
tional identities in new nations. Similarly, his concern with changes in the patterns of 
American religious participation is to formulate and test hypotheses about the function 
of religion for other institutions and the social system as a whole. The sociologist of reli-
gion seeks to locate the conditions under which the chiliastic religion occurs, what kinds 
of people are attracted to it, what happens to the sects and their adherents under vari-
ous conditions, and so on. There are clearly no problems of the historian. History must 
be concerned with the analysis of the particular set of events and processes. Where the 
sociologist looks for concepts which subsume a variety of particular descriptive catego-
ries, the historian must remain close to the actual happenings and avoid statements 
which, though linking behavior at one time and place to that elsewhere, lead to a distor-
tion in the description of what occurred in the set of circumstances being analyzed (Lip-
set 1968, 22-23). 
 
As Tilly (1981, 5) observes, the question of the division of labor between sociologists 
and historians, as expressed by scholars such as Lipset, is essentially similar to that 
«between the mycologist and the mushroom collector, between the critic and the 
translator, between the political analyst and the city hall reporter, between brains and 
brawn. History does the transcription, sociology the analysis». This is a clear mystifica-
tion to which, it should be said, historians have often contributed, as we can see from 
these words by Gareth Stedman Jones: 
 
Attitudes toward sociological theory among sociologically inclined historians have of-
ten verged on the credulous, and although more critical sociologists might have rejected 
as naively positivist any distinction between history and sociology which sees the one as 
“idiographic” and the other as “nomothetic”, many of these historians have behaved in 
practice as if they considered such a division of labour to be legitimate. Defensive about 
their own subject and repelled by an inadequately understood Marxism which appeared 
to be the only other contender, they have looked uncritically to sociology as a theoretical 
storehouse from which they could simply select concepts most serviceable for their indi-
vidual needs (Stedman Jones 1976, 300). 
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History cannot be seen as a kind of failed sociology, just as historical materials can-
not be treated as raw evidence waiting to be sociologically analyzed. In this regard, 
Charles Tilly offers a double argument through a distinction between «matters of fact» 
and «matters of principle» (Tilly 1981, 6). On a strictly factual ground, historians con-
duct their investigations following rules that differ significantly from those governing 
social science research, just as historical materials generally differ from those used in 
sociology. In terms of principle, it should also be said that any analysis of social pro-
cesses is equally historical. In fact, an analysis is historical only when it takes into con-
sideration the time and the place of the action in its explanations. From this point of 
view, the classic distinction between “generalizing” (or nomothetic) and “particulariz-
ing”(or idiographic) disciplines is not adequate. Historical analysis must be character-
ized by the integration of time and space. It is mainly the sociological analysis of 
change on a large scale to have an insufficient historical awareness. Therefore, socio-
logical theory needs to be grounded in history, that is, embedded in time. 
Both sociologists and historians, while following partially different logics, cannot re-
frain from seeking more adequate theories to investigate historical and social contexts. 
To achieve a similar result we should further explore the terrain of history. As Tilly ob-
serves (ibid., 12), the word “history” refers, at the same time, to a «phenomenon», to 
«a body of material» and to a «set of activities». 
 
A)  As a phenomenon, history represents the cumulative effect of past events on pre-
sent events. Let us think of the phenomenon of industrialization; scholars are di-
vided between those who believe that the processes of capital accumulation, eco-
nomic growth, exploitation of labor force, recur in a number of countries, following 
more or less the same lines, and those who believe that these processes vary de-
pending on the mode of industrialization of the countries that first initiated the dy-
namics of accumulation. Only the members of the first group can obviously adopt 
common procedures for synchronic comparison, since they assume the irrelevance 
of the temporal dimension; the members of the second group will avoid those 
forms of cross-sectional comparison, paying greater attention to the dynamics of 
historical development. 
B)  Seen as a set of materials, history appears as a persistent and residual body of past 
behaviors that can be brought to light through old news reports, witnesses’ ac-
counts, autobiographies and other narrative materials that may represent a small 
slice of past experience. Historians have generally focused primarily on written evi-
dence, although any remnant of the past, from working tools to graffiti left on 
walls, can constitute a small fragment of a past life. 
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C) Viewed as a set of activities, history is an attempt by scholars to reconstruct the 
past. An attempt that, according to Tilly (ibid., 13), is likely to be hopeless for two 
reasons, which, after a little reflection, will actually appear obvious. First, the avail-
ability of information on the past is likely to be almost inexhaustible, exceeding the 
effective capacity of even the most slavish historian to collect and synthesize them 
in a comprehensive way. Historians are compelled to make a choice by selecting 
only a small portion of the material available to them. Second, historians have to 
pick just a few of the many events occurred in the past, depending on the specific 
question on which the research design is built. Once the objectives of the survey 
are clearly defined, other information that is not closely related to them may be 
deemed irrelevant.  
 
In a few words, historical writing is based on the following aspects: those who com-
mit themselves to this work specialize in the reconstruction of past behaviors; they rely 
mainly on narrative texts that represent the remnants of the past; they emphasize only 
selected pieces of text taken as the most suitable means to perform the task of recon-
struction; they consider “where” and especially “when” some specific events are rele-
vant for their impact on social life, and may therefore constitute essential elements for 
their own explanation. The fact that the function of historical work is easily identifiable, 
does not mean it will always proceed according to an ordered pattern: 
 
In reality, the practice of history resembles a zoo more than a herbarium, and a her-
barium more than a cyclotron. In a Cyclotron a huge, costly, unified apparatus whirs into 
motion to produce a single focused result; history does not behave like that. In a herbar-
ium, a classificatory order prevails; each dried plant has its own niche. Historians divide 
their subject matter and their styles of thought into diplomatic, economic, intellectual, 
and other sorts of history, but the divisions are shifting, inexact … and often ignored in 
practice (ibid., 15-16). 
 
However, stating that historical practice is often methodologically inconsistent and 
inaccurate does not mean that historical processes are without meaning for the social 
sciences. Many social-scientific disciplines that have developed as if the historical ori-
gins of social phenomena were of no importance – particularly anthropology, sociology 
and political science – feel the need to restore their historical connections.  
 
 
 
 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 7(3) 2014: 576-615, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v7i3p576 
 
605 
 
5.1. The historical analysis of the structural macro-processes 
 
With the development of sociological practice, especially during the twentieth cen-
tury, the historical content of social processes was gradually dried up in the illusory at-
tempt to create a sort of natural (a-temporal) science of society. Only in the sixties and 
in particular the seventies of the twentieth century would eminent sociologists redis-
cover a taste for historical connections, especially in dealing with important issues such 
as industrialization, control of forms of rebellion and revolution, and family structure. A 
taste for historical and comparative analysis of large-scale processes of change began 
to spread among some social scientists, mainly because of disappointment over the in-
effectiveness shown by classical models of modernization and development.  
Sociological analysis has often had to undertake the study of history when dealing 
with two areas: first, large-scale structural change, and second, collective action with 
particular reference to the analysis of social movements, rebellions and revolutions. 
The search for general patterns in processes of industrialization, rationalization or po-
litical development leads scholars to make a double effort: on the one hand, they must 
identify the traits of great processes of change in specific historical periods, and on the 
other, they must connect specific transformations that were taking place in those times 
to the macro-processes of change previously identified. The attempt to formulate 
some general laws underlying revolutions or social movements, therefore, involves the 
need to find some regularities in collective action in specific historical periods. Accord-
ing to Tilly (1981, 44), in our time the two macro-processes to consider are undoubted-
ly represented by the expansion of the capitalist system and the development of nation 
states (as well as by the resulting system of states). 
If we agree with this idea, the historical problem we have to face lies in the need to 
determine how and why processes of capital accumulation occurred with the resulting 
dynamics of proletarianization; how and why the system of production relations 
spread, and finally what consequences resulted from this expansion. The temporal el-
ement here is essential and historical analysis indispensable. Moreover, there is the 
question of the nation state, understood as a complex organization in a position to 
monopolize the means of coercion in a specific territory. The nation state is autono-
mous, centralized, and its lines of internal division are formally coordinated, making it 
different from other organizations working in the same area. From this point of view, 
States are a relatively new phenomenon, since we can detect their traces only in the 
past few hundred years. Even the international political context, in Renaissance Eu-
rope, was largely characterized by formally independent political units, which were far 
from resembling the system of states typical of our times. Modern states can be histor-
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ically analyzed both in their internal dimension, by focusing on the dynamics through 
which some organizations manage to exercise a certain domination over the popula-
tions of a given territory, gradually becoming a State, and in the external dimension, by 
observing how those organizations defend their domination against pressure from out-
side organizations (other States). In both dimensions the question of War becomes 
crucial. Internally, war pushes rulers to exert strong pressure on their people in terms 
of taxes, conscription and requisitions; externally, it leads them to pursue war efforts 
through which they can affirm their right to exclusive control over a given territory. 
Now let us dwell briefly on the process of proletarianization that between capitalism 
and the nation-state is a very important concept for the analysis of structural macro-
processes. The proletarianization involves a set of processes that have involved a grow-
ing number of individuals. The workers lose control over the means of production and 
to survive are forced to sell their labor power in exchange for a wage. The characteris-
tic features of proletarianization are therefore the monetization of the economy, the 
expropriation of work by the owners of the means of production and the development 
of capitalism. 
It is a phenomenon that has most influenced the dynamics of social life above all in 
the Western world. According to Tilly (1981, 179), sociologists have failed to explain it 
in a correct and consistent way because of the distortions induced by Durkheim's theo-
ry on the dynamics of differentiation and integration (Tilly 1984). The problem of soci-
ology lies essentially in the adoption of one bad theory. Only neo-Marxist historians 
and sociologists have been able, within the limits of a certain ideological approach, to 
give an account of these processes in an appropriate manner. 
According to the prevailing sociological approach, social differentiation leads to 
greater productivity which, in turn, determines greater prosperity. It is always the dif-
ferentiation which, through a growing interdependence among individuals, induces a 
transformation of habits in social life. What causes this differentiation, however, re-
mains unclear. No explicit or implicit reference is made to the development of capital-
ism and the consequent process of proletarianization that, according to Tilly, can have 
three different meanings useful for analytical purposes: 
 
A) According to the more restrictive definition, proletarians are all those individuals 
who receive a salary in exchange for unskilled labor which is realized in large 
factories and regulated by an intense discipline. The characteristic elements of the 
process of proletarianization, according to this definition, would constitute the 
fragmentation, degradation and intensification of work. In this sense, it would be a 
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typical phenomenon of the nineteenth century and of the process of capitalist 
industrialization. 
B) There is also a broader definition, according to which proletarians would be all 
those who sell their workforce in exchange for a wage, regardless of the context in 
which the work takes place. According to this approach the process of proletaria-
nization would be realized in any production context, from cornfields to factories 
and to all the workplaces that in the twentieth century have been structured within 
the tertiary sector. 
C) There is then a final definition that we believe is best suited to the analysis of the 
processes of conflict in the nineteenth century and a good part of the twentieth, 
which is due to Marxian analysis expressed in the first book of Capital (Marx 1906), 
in which the concept of proletarian (and proletarianization) is applied to the world 
of the factory in a historical context of growing industrialization, but also to the 
agricultural world and, in particular, in the conflictual relations between the 
workers of the soil and the great landowners. According to this approach, anyone 
who is forced to sell his labor to the capitalists without any effective control over 
the means of production is designated a proletarian. In this sense, Marx's analysis 
emphasizes the features and processes of capitalist expropriation of labor. «Capita-
lism» and «proletarianization» are two related phenomena that can explain the 
transformation of social life between the eighteenth and twentieth century in a 
much more effective way than other phenomena such as «industrialization» and 
«modernization». 
 
It is in this context that the classic questions of political sociology are posed: how are 
the ruling class unable to maintain control over the economic and political life of a giv-
en area? Under what conditions can a population be active, organized and informed 
with respect to national politics? How are riots, rebellions and revolutions made? In 
this way, we can assume the power asymmetries and the participatory processes as 
historical problems to be connected to the two macro-processes represented by the 
development of the national states (and the system of states) and the expansion of the 
capitalist system of production. 
«Capitalism» and «statemaking» provide the backdrop for historically grounded ana-
lysis of collective action and the ways individuals act together in pursuit of shared in-
terests.  
 
Instead of the eternal behavior of crowds, we study the particular forms of action that 
people use to advance claims and register grievances. Instead of laws of social move-
ments, we study the emergence of the social movement as a political phenomenon. In-
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stead of power in general, we study the modalities of power within a certain mode of 
production (Tilly 1981, 46).  
 
In particular, the two macro-processes identified above influence the direction of 
change, acting on three fundamental components of collective action: the «interests» 
around which individuals decide to act collectively; their «capacity» to act in defense of 
those interests; and the «opportunity» to advance or defend those interests through 
coordinated collective actions. These are all issues of great relevance for the old as well 
as current political sociology. 
 
 
5.2. How to compare the historical macro-processes 
 
After identifying the macro-processes that shaped modernity and that, with the nec-
essary updates, are still the focus of political sociologists, we should understand how 
they can be compared. Here too we make use of the reflections of Charles Tilly. 
Firstly, we can then compare them with actual historical cases, trying to identify al-
ternative readings. Secondly, which is closely connected to the first, it is necessary to 
look for forms of generalization that are rooted in historical processes. In this sense, we 
do not need to pursue universal statements, more or less confirmed by a variety of in-
stances occurring in different places and at different times; rather, we need to connect 
a set of specific cases and variables to different periods and contexts, linking together 
similar cases, being constantly aware of their space and time limits. It is at this point 
that historical comparison becomes crucial to describe and explain structural dynamics 
and large processes. 
The analysis of structures and processes is conducted, according to the systematiza-
tion provided by Tilly, at four historical levels: 1) at a «world historical level», the re-
searcher's task is to identify the specific properties of an era, contextualize and fix 
them in the flow of human history. At this level, for example, we can find the different 
patterns of social evolution, the rise and fall of empires, the development and en-
trenchment of specific production patterns; 2) at a «world-systemic level», the re-
searcher's task is to discern connections and changes in the most important part of a 
broad set of interrelated social structures; 3) at a «macro-historical level», the re-
searcher must give an account of structures and processes also mentioning their alter-
native forms in graphic form; and 4) at a «micro-historical level», the researcher's task 
is to trace the connections of individuals and groups with such structures and process-
es, in the hope of being able to explain their impact on social life (Tilly 1984, 60-61). 
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Structures and processes are deemed relevant, therefore, depending on the level of 
analysis. At a world-historical level, the structures on which the attention of the re-
searcher is focused are those generally ascribable to the category of world-system, 
while the relevant processes are related to the transformation and the historical se-
quence of systems understood in their entirety. At this level, any discourse on the pro-
cesses of urbanization, industrialization and state-building would be inappropriate, as it 
would occur at a lower level than the wholeness of the world system. If a researcher 
chooses to operate at this level, any comparison, if necessary, should be based on a 
comparison between world systems and, as Tilly states, «My eyes falter and my legs 
shake on this great plan» (ibid., 63). 
At a historical systemic level, the dimension of world system continues to have its 
importance even if, in this case, the scholar focuses on those world-system compo-
nents that are based on networks of coercion and/or exchange. In the first case, the 
focus is mostly on the dimension of the nation state understood as a more or less cen-
tralized, differentiated and autonomous organization that has the capacity to control 
the means of coercion within a limited geographical area. In the second case, the re-
searcher focuses on the patterns of production at a national or regional level, specifi-
cally on the set of relationships between geographically segregated and interdepend-
ent individuals and groups that have certain factors of production. In this case, the 
most important processes are those related to the dynamics of production, distribution 
and subordination. The comparison is here intended to establish similarities and differ-
ences between networks of coercion and exchange, as well as between processes of 
subordination, production and distribution. At this level any attempt at generalization 
is dangerous, controversial and difficult to verify. 
With the macro-historical level, according to Tilly, «we enter the ground of history as 
historians ordinarily treat it» (ibid.). Within a given world system, we can certainly build 
states, modes of production, army associations, enterprises, networks, gradually giving 
life to our unit of analysis. At this level, processes such as proletarianization, accumula-
tion of capital, urbanization, state-building, bureaucratization are suitable for our anal-
ysis. In this case, the comparative measure is based on a comparison between these 
units, through which structural and procedural uniformity, variations and combinations 
can be identified. Their systematic study in specific macro-systems fully falls within the 
logic of a historically rooted analysis that should be taken as the foundation of our cog-
nitive activity. This should not lead us to underestimate the dimension of micro-history. 
When we analyze the impact of structures and processes on individuals and groups, 
we will necessarily draw a connection between personal experience and historical pro-
cess. In this case, the frames of reference concern the relationships between individu-
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als and social groups while processes are related to the transformation of the relations 
between individuals connected to those structural dynamics. If the researcher works at 
a micro level, any distinction between interactions and relationships will lose some of 
its meaning.  
Comparisons between systems of relationship and their transformation take shape 
and consistency in the close link between those systems of relationship and structural 
and procedural dimensions. In other words, the relationship between capitalists and 
workers makes sense only within the broader historical process of proletarianization 
and concentration of capital. Among the four levels of analysis, we prefer, with Tilly, to 
dwell on the comparisons conducted at the macro-historical level and particularly on 
that borderland comprising the connection between macro- and micro-historical di-
mensions. 
The objective is to identify a comparative approach able to account for the struc-
tures and processes that take place within a specific world system, so as to produce 
some limited – i.e. historically determined – generalizations. Since we aim to identify 
some regularity in such historical structures and processes, we do not need to analyze 
a large number of statistically treated instances. Comparative analysis of socio-histori-
cal processes and structures is most fruitful when we focus on a limited number of in-
stances and «that is not because of the intrinsically greater value of small numbers, but 
because large numbers give an illusory sense of security» (Tilly 1984, 77). In the analy-
sis of a small number of instances, the researcher has the opportunity to focus on the 
historical circumstances and the specific characteristics of each case, in order to identi-
fy some common features needed for comparison. 
Even if we abandon society as our unit of analysis, it does not mean that we must al-
so abandon the dimension of nation state; what we need is an awareness that our 
points of reference are a territorial area and a population controlled by the state insti-
tutional system and not a thing apart, as stated in the first pernicious postulate. Of 
course, researchers have some alternatives, meaning that, instead of the State, they 
can select different units of analysis, such as entire blocs of international powers, cities 
or city networks, regional modes of production, social classes, and so on. What is im-
portant for researchers is to have a clear idea of the objects of their analysis, before 
they produce any theoretical proposition. 
We can distinguish between different ways of comparing big structures and process-
es by classifying the different propositions that can potentially be drawn from compar-
ative analysis. To do so, for example. Tilly combines two dimensions of comparison: 
one based on the «sharing of all instances» and one that is based on a «multiplicity of 
forms». The first dimension refers to those accounts that emerge from a comparison 
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ranging from the analysis of a single event – aimed at highlighting the specific features 
of the case itself – to the analysis of more instances – intended to bring out the charac-
teristics of all the cases considered. The second dimension refers to those accounts 
that emerge from a comparison ranging from single – when all cases of a phenomenon 
have common properties - to multiple - when there are different forms of a phenome-
non. By combining the two dimensions, four possible approaches to comparison emer-
ge: «individualizing», «universalizing», «variation-finding», and «encompassing» com-
parisons.  
Individualizing comparisons are those that treat each case as essentially unique by 
minimizing the significance of any property in common with other cases. Purely univer-
salizing comparisons, in turn, are based on the identification of common properties in 
all cases. On the other hand, we have those types of comparisons that are based on the 
search for possible variations (variation finding) and, in particular, on the belief that we 
can establish a principle of change in the nature or intensity of a phenomenon starting 
from a systematic analysis of the differences between a number of instances. Encom-
passing comparisons are instead based on the analysis of different instances in differ-
ent places within the same macro-system. The purpose of this form of comparison is to 
explain the characteristics of each case in the light of an evolving relationship with the 
system as a whole. 
 
 
References 
 
Aberle D.F., A.K. Cohen, A.K. Davis, M.J. Levy Jr., F. Sutton (1972), “The Functional Pre-
requisites of a Society”, in Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, Homewood, Il-
linois: The Dorsey Press. 
Almond G.A., J.S. Coleman (1960, eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Anderson B.W. (1967), “On the Comparability of Meaningful Stimuli in Cross-Cultural 
Research”, Sociometry, 30(2): 124-136. 
Bartolini S. (1991), “Tempo e ricerca comparata”, in Sartori G., L. Morlino (eds.), Com-
parazione e metodo comparato, Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 165-209. 
Beckerman W. (1966), International Comparisons of Real Incomes, Paris: Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation. 
Beckerman W., R. Bacon (1966), “International Comparisons of Incomes Levels: A Sug-
gested New Measure”, The Economic Journal, 76(3): 519-536. 
Bendix R. (1967), “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered”, Comparative Studies in So-
Fabio de Nardis, The logical structures of the comparison 
  
612 
 
ciety and History, 9(3): 292-346, doi: 10.1017/S0010417500004527. 
Bennett M.K. (1966), “International Disparities in Consumption Levels”, The American 
Economic Review, 46(3): 452-461. 
Boudon R. (1984), Les methods en sociologie, Paris: Harmattan. 
Bruschi A. (1999), Metodologia delle scienze sociali, Milano: Bruno Mondadori. 
Caciagli M. (1988), “Quante Italie? Persistenza e trasformazione delle culture politiche 
sub-nazionali”, Polis, 1(2): 429-457. 
Cannavò L. (1984), “Definizioni operative, concettualizzazione e logica della ricerca”, 
Sociologia e ricerca sociale, 13: 99-140. 
Carr E.H. (1963), What is History?, New York: Knopf.  
Clarke J.J. (1970), “On the Unity and Diversity of Cultures”, American Anthropologist, 
72(3): 545-554. 
de Nardis (2011a), “Historical Comparison and Political Contention. The Sociological 
Analysis of Collective Action and Political Praxis in Antonio Gramsci and Charles Til-
ly”, Center for the Study of Politics and Society - WP Series, vol.1, issue 2, pp. 57-100. 
de Nardis F. (2011b), Sociologia comparata. Appunti sulle strutture logiche della ricerca 
sociopolitica, Milano: FrancoAngeli. 
Dilthey W. (1991) [1893], Introduction to the Human Sciences, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Dutkheim E. (1964) [1893], The Division of Labor Society, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.  
Eckstein H. (1975), “Case Study and Theory in Political Science”, in Greenstein F.J., N.W. 
Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, vol. VII, Strategies of Inquiry, Reading: 
Addison-Wesley, pp. 79-137. 
Eggan F.R. (1954), “Social Anthropology and Method of Controlled Comparison”, Amer-
ican Anthropologist, 56(5): 743-763. 
Ervin S., R.T. Bower (1952), “Translation Problems in International Surveys”, Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 16: 595-604. 
Eulau H. (1962), “Comparative Political Analysis: A Methodological Note”, Midwest 
Journal of Political Science, 6(4): 397-407, doi: 10.2307/2108772. 
Fideli R. (1998), La comparazione, Milano: Franco Angeli. 
Gadamer H.G.(1975) [1960], Truth and Method, New York: Blumsburry. 
Gurr T.R. (1966), New Error – Compensated Measures for Comparing Nations, Prince-
ton: Center for International Studies. 
Gurr T.R. (1968), “A Casual Model of Civic Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New In-
dices”, American Political Science Review, 62(4): 1104-1124, doi: 10.2307/1953907. 
Gusfield J.R. (1972), “Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of So-
cial Change”, in Shepard J.M., Organizational Issues in Industrial Society, Englewood 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 7(3) 2014: 576-615, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v7i3p576 
 
613 
 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, pp. 35-49. 
Habermas J. (1988) [1967], On the Logic of Social Sciences, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Inglehart R. (1990), Culture Shift in Industrial Advanced Societies, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Kalleberg A.L. (1966), “The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Com-
parative Study of Political System”, World Politics, 19(1): 69-82,  
  doi: 10.2307/2009843. 
Kluckohn C. (1962), Culture and Behavior, Glencoe: The Free Press. 
Lazarsfeld P.F. (1969), “Dai concetti agli indicatori empirici”, in Boudon R., P.F. Lazar-
sfeld (eds.), L’analisi empirica delle scienze sociali, Bologna: Il Mulino, vol.1. 
Lijphart A. (1971), “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, American Po-
litical Science Review, 65(3): 682-693, doi: 10.2307/1955513. 
Lijphart A. (1975), “The Comparable-Case Strategy in Comparative Research”, Compar-
ative Political Studies, 8(2): 158-177, doi:10.1177/001041407500800203. 
Lipset S.M. (1968), “History and Sociology: Some Methodological Considerations”, in 
Lipset S.M., R. Hofstadter (eds.), Sociology and History: Methods, New York: Basic 
Books, pp. 20-58. 
Marradi A. (1982), “Introduzione all’edizioni italiana” di Smelser N.J., La comparazione 
nelle scienze sociali, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Marradi A. (1987), Concetti e metodi in scienza politica, Firenze: Giuntina. 
Marx K. (1906) [1867], Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, New York: The Modern 
Library. 
Mauss M. (1954), The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, Glen-
coe: The Free Press. 
Mitchell R.E. (1968), “Survey Materials Collected in the Developing Countries: Obsta-
cles to Comparison”, in Rokkan S. (ed.), Comparative Research across Cultures and 
Nations, Paris-The Hague: Mouton, pp. 210-238. 
Moore B. jr. (1978), Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, White Plains: 
Sharpe.  
Przeworski A., H. Teune (1966), “Equivalence in Cross-National Research”, Public Opin-
ion Quarterly, 30(4): 551-568. 
Pye L.W. (1958), “The Non-Western Political Process”, Journal of Politics, 20(3): 468-
486, doi: 10.2307/2127224. 
Ragin C.C. (1987), The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantita-
tive Strategies, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. 
Sartori G. (1970), “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics”, The American Politi-
cal Science Review, 64(4): 1033-1053, doi: 10.2307/1958356. 
Fabio de Nardis, The logical structures of the comparison 
  
614 
 
Sartori G. (1976), Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sartori G. (1980), La politica: logica e metodo in scienze sociali, Milano: Sugarco. 
Sartori G. (1982), Teoria dei partiti e caso italiano, Milano: Sugarco. 
Sartori G. (1984), “Guidelines for Concept Analysis”, in Sartori G. (ed.), Social Science 
Concepts. A systematic Analysis, London: Sage, pp. 15-85. 
Scheuch E.K. (1968), “The Cross-Cultural Use of Sample Surveys: Problems of Compara-
bilities”, in Rokkan S. (ed.), Comparative Research across Cultures and Nations, Par-
is-The Hague: Mouton, pp. 176-209. 
Schneider C.Q., and C. Wgermann (2012), Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Scienc-
es: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis, New York: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Skocpol T. (1979), States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Rus-
sia and China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Smelser N.J. (1976), Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Stedman Jones G. (1976), “From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History”, British 
Journal of Sociology, 27: 295-305. 
Tilly Ch. (1981), As Sociology Meets History, New York: The Academic Press. 
Tilly Ch. (1984), Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, New York: Russel 
Sage Foundation. 
Tocqueville A. (2003) [1835-1840], Democracy in America, London: Penguin Books. 
Verba S., N. Nie, J. Kim (1978), Participation and Political Equality. A Seven-Nation 
Comparison, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Wilson E.C. (1958), “Problems of Survey Research in Modernizing Areas”, Public Opin-
ion Quarterly, 22(3): 230-234. 
Winch P. (1958), The Idea of Social Sciences, New York: Routledge. 
Wright Mills C. (1959), The Sociological Imagination, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Zelditch M. Jr. (1971), “Intelligible Comparisons”, in Vallier I. (ed.), Comparative Meth-
ods in Sociology. Essays on Trends and Applications, Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, pp. 267-308. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 7(3) 2014: 576-615, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v7i3p576 
 
615 
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION: 
 
Fabio de Nardis is Associate Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Salento 
(Italy) where he is also Director of the Centre for the Study of Politics and Society 
(CSPS). Editor-in-Chief of the Italian/International journal of socio-political studies PAR-
TECIPAZIONE E CONFLITTO, he is the author of about 80 publications on political partic-
ipation, social movements, political cultures and identities, democratization and socio-
political theory.  
